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Abstract 
In the context of fear conditioning, different psychophysiological measures have been 
related to different learning processes. Specifically, skin conductance responses (SCRs) have 
been related to cognitive expectancy learning, while fear potentiated startle (FPS) has been 
proposed to reflect affective learning that operates according to simple associative learning 
principles. On the basis of this two level account of fear conditioning we predicted that FPS 
should be less affected  by verbal instructions and more affected by direct experience than SCRs. 
We tested this hypothesis by informing participants that contingencies would be reversed after a 
differential conditioning phase. Our results indicate that contingency reversal instructions led to 
an immediate and complete reversal of FPS regardless of the previous conditioning history. This 
change was accompanied by similar changes on US expectancy ratings and SCRs. These results 
conform with an expectancy model of fear conditioning but argue against a two level account of 
fear conditioning. 
 
Keywords: Fear conditioning; Instructions; Fear Potentiated Startle; Skin Conductance 
Response; Reversal learning; Expectancy learning; Affective learning 
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Potentiation of the startle reflex is in line with contingency reversal instructions rather than the 
conditioning history  
Fear conditioning is an adaptive process through which organisms learn to fear and avoid 
a conditioned stimulus (CS) that has been paired with an aversive event (unconditioned stimulus, 
US). This is usually modeled in the lab by pairing neutral stimuli (lights, geometric shapes) with 
an unpleasant but harmless electric stimulus. For humans, fear conditioning is often believed to 
be mediated by the generation of cognitive expectancies about the occurrence of the US in the 
presence of the CS (e.g., Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2009; Reiss, 1980). 
However, according to the two level account of human fear conditioning (e.g., Hamm & Weike, 
2005; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Sevenster, Beckers, & Kindt, 2012a), this cognitive contingency 
learning between the CS and the US is supplemented with affective learning. Affective learning 
is proposed to be a highly automatic process, taking place independent of cognitive contingency 
learning (Baeyens, Eelen, & Crombez, 1995; Hamm & Weike, 2005; Mineka & Öhman, 2002; 
Öhman & Mineka, 2001) and mediated by a specifically dedicated neural system centered on the 
amygdala (Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). 
These two forms of learning have been mapped onto different physiological responses 
(Hamm & Weike, 2005). Conditioned skin conductance responses (SCRs) are usually considered 
to reflect cognitive contingency learning about the occurrence of the aversive US in the presence 
of the CS (e.g., Dawson & Furedy, 1976; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). This hypothesis is 
supported by studies showing that conditioning of the SCRs only occurs when participants are 
aware of the CS-US contingencies (e.g., Dawson, 1970; Dawson & Furedy, 1976; Sevenster et 
al., 2014; Singh et al., 2013) and that conditioned SCRs are very sensitive to verbal instructions 
(Hugdahl, 1978; Luck & Lipp, 2015b; Sevenster et al., 2012a). Conditioned potentiation of the 
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startle reflex (or fear potentiated startle, FPS), on the other hand, is believed to primarily reflect 
affective learning. Evidence for this idea was provided by studies suggesting that conditioning of 
the startle reflex does not require awareness of the CS-US contingency (Hamm & Weike, 2005; 
Hamm & Vaitl, 1996; Sevenster et al., 2014) and that FPS is less sensitive to verbal instructions 
(Dawson, Rissling, Schell, & Wilcox, 2007; Sevenster et al., 2012). Furthermore, in a number of 
recent psychopharmacological studies, FPS was abolished by the administration of propranolol 
during a reconsolidation period while leaving expectancy of the US and SCRs intact, 
demonstrating a strong dissociation between FPS and cognitive measures of conditioned fear 
(Kindt, Soeter, & Vervliet, 2009; Soeter & Kindt, 2010). However, the evidence is not 
unequivocal. For instance, in a number of other studies, conditioning of the startle reflex was 
obtained only for participants who became aware of the CS-US contingencies (Dawson, Rissling, 
et al., 2007; Grillon, 2002; Jovanovic et al., 2006; Purkis & Lipp, 2001).  
In the current study, we tested a different prediction that follows from the proposal that 
FPS reflect automatic affective learning. That is, if FPS primarily reflects simple associative 
learning, it should primarily be a function of the past stimulus pairings (i.e., conditioning history; 
Lipp & Purkis, 2005) and should be relatively insensitive to verbal instructions about future 
stimulus pairings (Mineka & Öhman, 2002; Sevenster et al., 2012a). To test this hypothesis, we 
made use of the contingency reversal procedure (Grings, Schell, & Carey, 1973; McNally, 1981; 
Wilson, 1968). In this procedure, participants are informed after a differential conditioning phase 
that the contingencies of the first phase will be reversed in a second phase. Consequently, in this 
second phase, cognitive contingency information as provided by the verbal instructions is 
directly opposed to what has been learned through CS-US pairings in the first phase. If learning 
is a function of experienced stimulus pairings, conditioned responses in the second phase should 
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be in line with the conditioning history of the first phase. However, if learning is the result of 
cognitive beliefs regarding the CS-US contingency, conditioned responses should be in line with 
the verbal instructions, regardless of the conditioning history. In previous studies employing this 
procedure with SCRs as the measure of conditioning (Grings et al., 1973; McNally, 1981; 
Wilson, 1968), conditioning in the second phase of the experiment was in line with the verbal 
instructions and no evidence for effects of past stimulus pairings was obtained. 
In a recent study by Costa, Bradley, and Lang (2015), fear was installed in a first phase 
by providing threat information to participants. In a second phase, one of the threatened CSs was 
instructed to be safe, while the other threatened CS remained a threatening stimulus. Similarly, 
for the initially safe CSs, one of these was threatened, while the other CS remained safe. This 
adapted reversal procedure allowed them to compare reversed and non-reversed CSs after the 
reversal instructions and thus controlled for time-related changes (e.g., habituation, sensitization) 
that could explain the reversal effect. Costa et al. (2015) found that fear reactions, including FPS, 
completely reversed on the basis of verbal contingency instructions, which demonstrates that 
FPS is very sensitive to cognitive information (see also: Grillon, Ameli, Woods, Merikangas, & 
Davis, 1991). However, conditioned responses in their study were  instantiated only via verbal 
threat instructions and not by direct conditioning. Therefore, pairings of the CS in close 
proximity to the US were absent in the study of Costa et al. (2015), possibly excluding simple 
associative learning as the result of actual stimulus pairings (Blair, Schafe, Bauer, Rodrigues, & 
LeDoux, 2001). Hence, it is possible that affective learning did not take place in the study of 
Costa et al. (2015) due to the absence of CS-US pairings (see also: Olsson & Phelps, 2007, 
2004). Therefore, in the current study, we set out to investigate whether FPS to a threatened CS 
can be reversed on the basis of verbal instructions, even when this CS has actually been paired 
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with the US. Furthermore, we included threatened, but not actually conditioned CSs in our 
experiment to conceptually replicate the results of Costa et al. (2015) and to compare reversal on 
these CSs to reversal of threatened CSs that have been actually paired with the US. In line with 
the hypothesis that FPS reflects affective learning, we predicted that reversal of conditioned 
responses would be less pronounced for FPS than for SCR and ratings of US expectancy when 
threat instructions are combined with direct CS-US pairings. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six right-handed students (11 men, 25 women) at Ghent University participated in 
the experiment in exchange for €8. Age ranged between 18 and 32 years (M = 21.44, SD = 2.66). 
Psychophysiological data from one participant was lost due to a recording error. All participants 
completed an informed consent form and were instructed that they could discontinue the 
experiment at any point without any negative consequences. This study was approved by the 
ethics committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University. 
Material 
Conditioned Stimuli. CSs were six white geometric shapes (circle, square, triangle, 
pentagon, trapezium and diamond) with a maximal radius, longitude and/or latitude of 300 pixels 
presented in the middle of a 17 inch Dell computer screen (resolution: 1024 by 768 pixels) with a 
black background. Assignment of these shapes to the different CS types (see Table 1) was 
randomized over participants.   
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Table 1. Overview of the Different CS Types. 
CS Relationship with the US Contingency reversal? 
CS+T/P Threatened + paired No 
R-CS+T/P Threatened + paired Yes 
CS+T Threatened No 
R-CS+T Threatened Yes 
CS- Safe No 
R-CS- Safe Yes 
 
Unconditioned Stimulus. The US was an electric stimulus that consisted of 10 rectangular 
pulses of 2 ms with and inter pulse interval of 8 ms, creating an electric stimulus of 100 ms. This 
stimulus was administered by two lubricated Fukuda standard Ag/AgCl electrodes (1-cm 
diameter; inter-electrode distance: ~2-cm) to the left leg over the retromalleolar course of the 
sural nerve. The stimulus was generated by a constant current stimulator (DS7A, Digitimer, 
Hertfordshire, UK). The intensity of the electric stimulus was determined for each participant 
individually to be unpleasant but not painful using a stepwise work-up procedure (see the 
Procedure section for details concerning this work-up procedure). 
Psychophysiology 
Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs). SCRs were collected using a Coulbourn V71-23 
skin conductance coupler (Coulbourn Instruments, Allentown, PA) and disposable Ag/AgCl 
electrodes (3M Red Dot 2259-50, 17 mm diameter)  attached to the thenar and hypothenar 
eminences of the non-dominant hand. The signal was measured using a constant voltage coupler 
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(0.5 V) and digitized at 10 Hz. The collected data were smoothed and further analyzed offline 
with Psychophysiological Analysis (PSPHA) (De Clercq, Verschuere, De Vlieger, & Crombez, 
2006). SCRs were calculated by subtracting the mean value of a baseline period (2 seconds 
before CS onset) from the highest amplitude within a 1 to 7 seconds interval after CS onset 
(Milad, Orr, Pitman, & Rauch, 2005; Pineles, Orr, & Orr, 2009; Raes, De Houwer, De Schryver, 
Brass, & Kalisch, 2014; Soeter & Kindt, 2012). In this scoring method, negative values and 
values smaller than 0.02µS were recoded to zero. Finally, collected SCRs were range corrected 
with the highest recorded amplitude for that participant to account for individual differences in 
responsivity (Lykken & Venables, 1971) and square root transformed to normalize the data 
(Dawson, Schell, Filion, & Berntson, 2007). 
Fear Potentiated Startle (FPS). FPS was measured using two miniature Ag/AgCl 
electrodes (0.5 cm diameter) filled with conductive gel. One electrode was placed just below the 
pupil of the left eye and the other electrode was placed approximately 1 cm laterally. A ground 
electrode was placed in the middle of the forehead (Blumenthal et al., 2005). Electrode sites were 
first gently cleaned with scrub gel and water. The raw electromyographic signal was amplified 
50,000 times, filtered online (band pass: 13 – 1000 Hz) and digitally stored at 1000 Hz using a 
Coulbourn V75-01 bioamplifier (Coulbourn Instruments, Allentown, PA). The acquired data 
were rectified and smoothed in the area of interest (0 – 150 ms after probe onset) with a FIR 
filter (Nitschke, Miller, & Cook, 1998) using PSPHA. The startle probe was a 50 ms white noise 
burst (104 dB) generated using a V85-05C Coulbourn audio module and administered via 
Sennheiser headphones. 
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The acquired signal was scored semi-automatically using PSPHA by subtracting the mean 
baseline value (0 - 20 ms after probe onset) from the peak value in the 21 - 150 ms window after 
probe onset. All startle responses were visually inspected and scored as missing values if a 
voluntary blink occurred just before, during or after probe onset, or if there were any other 
artifacts obscuring the startle response. On average, 4.25% of the trials were scored as missing 
for each participant (SD = 3.38; Range = 0% – 11.11%). The scores were subsequently T-
transformed to control for inter-individual differences in responsivity. 
US expectancy ratings  
US expectancy ratings were collected on each trial using a 9-point Likert scale presented 
below the CSs with 5 anchor points: 1 = “not at all”, 3 = “probably not”, 5 = “uncertain”, 7 = “to 
some extent”, 9 = “certainly”. Above the CSs, the question “To what extent do you expect the 
electric stimulus?” was presented. Participants indicated their answer by clicking one of the 
response options of the Likert scale with the computer mouse using their dominant hand. 
Questionnaire 
The trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983; Dutch translation: van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 2000) 
was used to determine the general anxiety level of the participants. 
Procedure 
Work-up procedure. After filling in the informed consent form and the STAI-T 
questionnaire (Spielberger et al., 1983; van der Ploeg et al., 2000), participants first went through 
a work-up procedure to determine the  intensity level of the electric stimulus. During this 
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procedure, participants were exposed to gradually increasing stimulus intensity levels and were 
asked to report on their experience. Specifically, participants were asked after each intensity 
level to verbally rate the electric stimulus on a painfulness scale ranging from zero (not painful at 
all) to ten (maximally tolerable pain). A minimal painfulness threshold for the electric stimulus 
was set at seven. The procedure was stopped when participants indicated that they felt 
uncomfortable experiencing higher intensities of the electric stimulus. If a participant gave a 
rating of less than seven and indicated that he or she did not want to experience a more intense 
electric stimulus, the work-up was also stopped and the stimulus with the highest tolerated 
intensity was selected1.  The final selected electric stimulus intensity levels ranged between 1.6 
and 14 mA (M = 5.00, SD = 2.62) and pain ratings ranged between 6 and 9.5 (M = 7.88, SD = 
0.81). After the work-up procedure, psychophysiology recording electrodes were applied as 
described above. Finally, headphones for the startle probe administration were put on. 
Participants were verbally informed that these headphones served to present loud but harmless 
noises to them throughout the experiment.  
Contingency instructions and memory test. After the work-up procedure, further 
instructions regarding the experiment were provided on the computer screen in the absence of the 
experimenter. Participants were asked to read the instructions carefully. The instructions started 
with an overview of the different geometric shapes together with the names of these shapes to 
make sure participants would understand the instructions regarding these shapes. Next, 
participants were told that some of the shapes would be followed by the electric stimulus and that 
their task was to indicate to what extent they expect that stimulus after the shape by clicking one 
                                                 
1
 The results remained similar when the data of four participants who did not reach the painfulness 
threshold were excluded. 
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of the options on the scale below the shape. Additionally, participants were told that even CSs 
that could be followed by an electric stimulus would often not be followed by an electric 
stimulus. This instruction was added to keep the instructions about CS-US relations credible for 
the instructed CS+s that were never actually paired with a US (see Table 1; see the 
supplementary materials for a translation of the instructions in the experiment).  
Next, participants were instructed about which four geometrical shapes would be 
predictive of the electric stimulus and which other two shapes would not be followed by the 
electric stimulus. Participants were told to remember these instructions well because they would 
afterwards be tested to ascertain that they had memorized the instructions. During this test, 
participants were shown all the different geometrical shapes twice in a random order. They were 
asked to indicate for each shape whether it could be followed by the electric stimulus by clicking 
one of three response buttons projected on the computer screen below the shapes (yes, no, 
uncertain). There was no response deadline during the test. After responding, participants 
received feedback for 400 ms indicating whether they were correct. If they made an error on one 
of the twelve trials or indicated that they were unsure about the correct response, they received 
the contingency instructions again and had to redo the test, until they passed it (average number 
of memory tests until pass = 1.31, SD = 0.58, Range = 1-3).  
Conditioning phase. Following the contingency instructions, participants continued to the 
first phase of the experiment. This phase started with six startle probe habituation trials (ITI: 7 s). 
After these habituation trials, all six different CSs were presented six times (36 trials total). CSs 
were presented on the screen for eight seconds and were preceded by a fixation cross presented 
for one second. Startle probes were administered on each trial seven seconds after CS onset 
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(Sevenster et al., 2012a). The ITI was 13, 15 or 17 seconds, randomly selected. Trial order was 
randomized in small blocks containing two presentations of each CS (limiting the number of 
consecutive identical trials to maximally four). Two of the four CSs that had been instructed to 
be contingent with the electric stimulus were followed by the stimulus immediately at offset on 
three trials (50% reinforcement rate; CS+T/P’s). The other two threatened shapes were never 
reinforced (CS+T’s, see Table 1). The reinforcement rate of the CS+T/P’s was chosen to be 50% 
because this is low enough to maintain the credibility of the threat instructions for the threatened 
but not paired CS+T’s, but also high enough to allow for a sufficient number of CS-US pairings 
for the CS+T/P’s. Reinforcement of the CS+T/P’s with the US was distributed equally over the 
course of the conditioning phase (one reinforcement on the first or the second trial, the third or 
the fourth trial and the fifth or the sixth trial, randomly determined). SCRs, FPS and US 
expectancy ratings were collected on every trial as described above. 
Reversal instructions and memory test. Following the conditioning phase, participants 
received new instructions that informed them that in the next phase of the experiment, other 
shapes would predict the electric stimulus. Three shapes were instructed to be predictive of the 
electric stimulus during this second phase, of which one was previously reinforced (CS+T/P), 
one was previously threatened (CS+T) and one was previously safe (R-CS-; see Table 1). 
Furthermore, three shapes were instructed to not be followed by electric stimulus during the 
second phase, of which one was previously paired with the stimulus (R-CS+T/P), one was 
previously threatened (R-CS+T) and one was previously safe (CS-; see Table 1). As for the 
previous contingency instructions, participants again had to complete a short test to make sure 
that they remembered these new instructions. The procedure of this memory test was the same as 
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for the previous test. Participants could again continue to the next part of the experiment only if 
they completed the test without making errors (average number of memory tests until pass = 
1.39, SD = 0.64, Range = 1-3). 
Reversal phase and believability rating. The procedure of the reversal phase was identical 
to the procedure of the conditioning phase except that none of the CSs were reinforced during 
this phase. The reversal phase was followed by a final question that asked participants to indicate 
to what extent they found the instructions of the experiment believable at the moment they 
received them. They could select one option of a dropdown list: “not believable”, “not very 
believable”, “believable” and “very believable”. 
Data analysis 
In order to present the data of this relatively complex experiment in a concise and clear 
way, we averaged our collected measures for each of the CSs over trials within the two phases, 
thus ignoring the factor trial. Exclusion of this factor did not alter our conclusions because the 
results for the different CSs were consistent over trials. Results and graphs including the factor 
trial are provided in the supplementary materials. The averaged data were first analyzed with the 
within-subject factors CS (CS+T/P, CS+T, CS-), reversal (yes, no) and phase (conditioning, 
reversal). The crucial effect in this analysis is, for our purposes, the three-way interaction which 
indicates whether reversal instructions resulted in a reduction of conditioned fear for the reversed 
relative to the consistent CS+T/P and CS+T in the reversal phase, but an increase in conditioned 
fear for the reversed relative to the consistent CS-.  Furthermore, results from the reversal phase 
were analyzed separately employing omnibus ANOVAs. Specifically, in a first ANOVA we 
compared the three CSs that, according to the instructions for the second phase, could be 
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followed by the US (i.e., CS+T/P, CS+T, R-CS-; see Table 1). If the prior conditioning history 
carried over to the reversal phase, conditioned fear reactions in this phase to the CS+T/P should 
be higher than to the R-CS- and CS+T. A similar ANOVA was carried out to compare the 
different CSs that, according to the instructions for the second phase, would not be followed by a 
US (CS-, R-CS+T/P, R-CS+T; see Table 1). Again, if the conditioning history of the conditioning 
phase carried over to the reversal phase, conditioned fear reactions to the R-CS+T/P should be 
higher than to the R-CS+T and the CS-. Degrees of freedom of these ANOVAs were corrected 
with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections when the sphericity assumption was violated. Finally, we 
calculated Bayes Factors (BF) using JASP (version 0.6; Love et al., 2015) for our different 
ANOVAs to complement the results of these traditional analyses. As discussed extensively 
elsewhere, there are several important limitations to classical null hypothesis significance testing 
(NHST) (e.g., Wagenmakers, 2007). A problem that is of particular relevance for our own 
research question is that a non-significant result in NHST does not provide evidence for the null 
hypothesis (and hence, does not provide evidence for the absence of an effect). Thus, the absence 
of a significant effect in the traditional ANOVAs does not inform us whether there was a genuine 
absence of an effect of the prior conditioning phase or of verbal instructions, or whether our data 
was inconclusive in this regard. However, Bayesian hypothesis testing does allow to quantify the 
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (reflected by the BF) and thus allows to evaluate whether 
effects were genuinely absent or whether our data was inconclusive (e.g., Dienes, 2014; Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). In line with Jeffreys (1961; see also: Andraszewicz et 
al., 2015) we considered BFs between 1/3 and 1 as anecdotal evidence for the absence of an 
effect. BFs smaller than 1/3 or smaller than 1/10 were considered substantial and strong 
evidence, respectively, for the absence of an effect. Similarly, BFs between 1 and 3 were 
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considered anecdotal evidence for the presence of an effect, while BFs greater than 3 or 10 were 
considered to be substantial and strong evidence for the presence of an effect, respectively. 
Results 
Believability of the instructions. 
Thirty-one of the participants indicated that the instructions in the experiment were 
believable or very believable. Three participants indicated that the instructions were not very 
believable. Ratings from two participants were missing. Overall, these results indicate that our 
instructions were considered believable by the participants. The results remained similar 
regardless of whether we included or excluded participants who indicated that the instructions 
were not very believable. Below, we report only the results for the full sample.  
US expectancy ratings. 
The crucial three-way interaction between CS, reversal and phase reached significance 
for the US expectancy ratings, F(1.27, 44.36) = 339.08, p < .001, ηp
2 = .91. This interaction was 
driven by a significant increase in US expectancy ratings for the R-CS- from the conditioning 
phase to the reversal phase, while US expectancy ratings for the R-CS+T/P and R-CS+T 
decreased (see Figure 1, all t-values > 18, p-values < .001, Cohen’s d’s > 3.8). US expectancy 
ratings for the consistent CS-, CS+T/P and CS+T did not differ significantly across the two 
phases (all t-values < 1, p-values > .3, Cohen’s d’s < 0.14; see Figure 1). Hence, US expectancy 
ratings were very sensitive to the contingency reversal instructions. The Bayesian analysis 
confirmed that this three-way interaction was a very robust result (BF = ~∞). 
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The omnibus ANOVA comparing the CS-, the R-CS+T/P and the R-CS+T, did not reach 
significance, F(1.69, 59.17) = 2.06, p = .143, ηp
2 = .06. This results suggests that there is little 
difference in US expectancy between a consistent CS- and a previously conditioned CS+ or 
threatened CS+ after contingency reversal instructions (see Figure 1). However, the result of the 
Bayesian analysis shows that there is only anecdotal evidence for an absence of a difference 
between these CSs (BF = .445). The omnibus ANOVA comparing CS+T/P, CS+T and R-CS- did 
reach significance, F(1.73, 60.61) = 3.63, p = .039, ηp
2 = .09. This overall effect was due to 
significantly higher US expectancy ratings for CS+T/P than for R-CS-, t(35) = 2.24, p = .031, 
Cohen’s d = 0.17, and CS+T, t(35) = 1.93, p = .062, Cohen’s d = 0.13 (see Figure 1). There was 
no significant difference between R-CS- and CS+T, t(35) < 1, p = .449, Cohen’s d = 0.04. Hence, 
this result demonstrates that US expectancy was slightly elevated for a consistent CS+ that was 
previously paired with the electric stimulus compared to a previously threatened CS+ or a 
reversed CS-. However, there is only anecdotal evidence for this effect according to the 
corresponding Bayesian analysis (BF = 1.49). 
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Figure 1. Mean US expectancy rating for the different types of CSs in the two phases of the 
experiment. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
SCR. 
The crucial interaction between CS, reversal and phase reached significance for SCRs as 
well, F(1.74, 59.20) = 5.29, p = .010, ηp
2 = .10. SCRs were lower for all CSs in the reversal 
phase compared to the conditioning phase (t-values > 1.9, p-values < .07, Cohen’s d’s > 0.39; see 
Figure 2), except for R-CS-, t(34) = -1.17, p = .250, Cohen’s d = -0.24. More importantly, SCRs 
were larger for R-CS- than for CS- in the reversal phase, while SCRs for these two CSs were 
comparable in the conditioning phase (see Figure 2), interaction between reversal and phase for 
the two types of CS-‘s, F(1, 34) = 5.65, p = .023, ηp
2 = .14.  The reversed pattern was found for 
CS+T. That is, smaller SCRs were found for the R-CS+T compared to the CS+T in the reversal 
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phase, again despite these two CSs being comparable in the conditioning phase (see Figure 2), 
interaction between reversal and phase for the CS+T’s: F(1, 34) = 4.50, p = .041, ηp
2 = .12. 
However, there was no indication for an effect of verbal instructions on the CS+T/P’s, interaction 
between reversal and phase for CS+T/P’s, F(1, 34) < 1. That is, SCRs were comparable for 
CS+T/P and R-CS+T/P both in the reversal and conditioning phase (see Figure 2). These results 
demonstrate that our reversal instructions successfully induced larger SCRs for a reversed CS- 
and reduced SCRs for a reversed threatened CS+. Interestingly, however, our reversal 
instructions did not significantly influence conditioned SCRs to a threatened CS+ that has 
actually been paired with the US (i.e., CS+T/P). In fact, a Bayesian analysis showed that there 
was substantial evidence for an absence of an effect of verbal instructions on the CS+T/P’s (BF 
interaction reversal and phase = 0.254). Furthermore, the Bayesian analysis of the three-way 
interaction between CS, reversal and phase showed that there was only anecdotal evidence for an 
effect of verbal instructions on SCRs (BF= 2.527). 
The results from the reversal phase were again further explored using an ANOVA that 
compared responses to CS-, R-CS+T and R-CS+T/P. This ANOVA did not reveal a significant 
effect, F(2, 68) = 2.05, p = .136, ηp
2 = .06, thus failing to provide evidence for transfer effects of 
the conditioning phase to the reversal phase for these CSs. The corresponding Bayesian analysis 
showed that there was only anecdotal evidence for an absence of difference between these CSs 
(BF = 0.454). Likewise, the ANOVA comparing R-CS-, CS+T and CS+T/P did not reach 
significance, F(2, 68) = 1.17, p = .318, ηp
2 = .03, thus also failing to provide evidence for transfer 
effects of the conditioning history to the verbally established CS+s in the reversal phase on 
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SCRs. In fact, the corresponding Bayesian analysis showed that our data provided substantial 
evidence for an absence of transfer effects (BF = 0.221). 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean range corrected and square root transformed SCRs (measured in µS) for the 
different types of CSs in the two phases of the experiment. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
FPS. 
The crucial three-way interaction between CS, reversal and phase was significant for FPS 
as well, F(1.64, 55.91) = 13.35, p < .001, ηp
2 = .28. As for SCRs, a general reduction of startle 
magnitude was observed in the reversal phase for all CSs (see Figure 3; t-values > 3.9, p-values 
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< .001, Cohen’s d’s > 1.00) except for R-CS-, t(34) < 1, p = .925, Cohen’s d = 0.03. Importantly, 
reversal instructions resulted in larger FPS for R-CS- than for CS- in the reversal phase, while 
FPS was comparable for both these CSs in the conditioning phase (see Figure 3), interaction 
between phase and reversal for CS-‘s: F(1, 34) = 11.83, p = .002, ηp
2 = .26. This pattern was 
reversed for the CS+T’s, with smaller FPS for R-CS+T than for CS+T in the reversal phase, even 
though FPS was comparable for these two CSs in the conditioning phase (see Figure 3), 
interaction between phase and reversal for CS+T’s: F(1, 34) = 11.86, p = .002, ηp
2 = .26. A 
similar pattern was obtained for CS+T/P and R-CS+T/P. That is, FPS was also smaller for R-
CS+T/P than for CS+T/P in the reversal phase, while it was comparable for these two CSs in the 
conditioning phase (see Figure 3), interaction between phase and reversal for CS+T/P’s, F(1, 34) 
= 9.26, p = .004, ηp
2 = .21. Combined, these results demonstrate that our verbal instructions were 
successful in influencing FPS both for previously safe and threatened CSs, including CSs that 
were actually followed by US. That is, reversal instructions resulted in an increase of FPS for the 
reversed CS- while it decreased FPS for a reversed threatened CS+, regardless of whether this 
CS+ was actually paired with the US. The Bayesian analysis confirmed the robustness of this 
effect of verbal instructions (BF three-way interaction CS, reversal and phase = 567 304). 
The ANOVAs comparing the different CS-‘s (CS-, R-CS+T/P, R-CS+T) and CS+’s (R-
CS-, CS+T/P, CS+T) in the reversal phase did not reach significance, F-values < 1. The 
corresponding BFs for these respective ANOVAs were 0.160 and 0.111. Hence, our data provide 
substantial evidence for an absence of transfer effects of the previous conditioning history to the 
reversal phase for FPS. 
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Figure 3. Mean T-transformed startle response (measured in µV) for the different types of CSs in 
the two phases of the experiment. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
STAI scores 
STAI-T scores ranged between 21 and 59 (M = 37.31, SD = 9.72). For exploratory 
purposes, participants were divided in a low and high anxiety group by means of a median-split. 
When this factor was added to the analyses as a between-subjects variable, it did not interact 
with the crucial three-way interaction between CS, reversal and phase for any of our measures of 
fear, F-values < 1, BFs < 0.1. Furthermore, the three-way interaction between CS, reversal and 
phase remained present for both the low and high anxiety groups for all measures, F-values > 4, 
p-values < .05, ηp
2’s > .20, except for the low anxiety group on SCRs, F(2, 28) = 1.27, p = .297, 
ηp
2 = .08. However, this latter result could be due to the limited size of this sample (N = 15). 
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Furthermore, our results should be interpreted with caution because of the small samples in the 
low and high anxiety groups and because there was only a limited range in anxiety scores. 
Nevertheless, these results indicate that even in a sample with relatively elevated anxiety scores 
(Mean STAI-T = 45.29, SD = 7.56, Range = 37 – 59), contingency reversal instructions seemed to 
be successful. 
Discussion 
In the current study, we investigated whether verbal instructions can reverse conditioned 
fear responses. In the two level account of human fear conditioning (Hamm & Weike, 2005; 
Sevenster et al., 2012), FPS is considered to be a measure of automatic affective learning that 
operates according to simple associative learning principles whereas SCR is assumed to capture 
cognitive expectancies. We therefore predicted that the effect of reversal instructions on 
conditioned fear reactions would be less pronounced for FPS than for SCR, especially when CSs 
have been repeatedly paired with the US. Our results demonstrated that all measures of 
conditioned fear were sensitive to the contingency reversal instructions. Interestingly, we also 
obtained suggestive evidence for effects of CS-US pairings for US expectancy ratings and SCRs, 
but not FPS.  
FPS reactions in the second phase of the experiment were completely in line with the 
verbal instructions, and no evidence for effects of the prior CS-US pairings were obtained for 
FPS. These results extend the findings of Costa et al. (2015) by showing that reversal of FPS can 
take place even when threat instructions are combined with actual CS-US pairings. Hence, even 
though there was opportunity for simple associative learning to take place in the current study 
(Olsson & Phelps, 2004), verbal instructions still primarily determined FPS. This finding is even 
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more striking in light of the significant impact of actual CS-US pairings on other measures that 
are typically considered to be more cognitive in nature (i.e., SCRs, US expectancy ratings). 
Hence, our results do not fit well with the two level account of fear conditioning that propose 
that FPS is a measure of automatic affective learning that operates according to the principles of 
simple associative learning (Blair et al., 2001; Lipp & Purkis, 2005) and that is independent from 
cognitive contingency learning as measured by SCRs and expectancy ratings (Hamm & Weike, 
2005; Hamm & Vaitl, 1996; Sevenster et al., 2012a). Rather, the results in the current study 
suggest that FPS is very sensitive to verbal instructions and is not influenced by previous CS-US 
pairings.  
Less surprisingly, US expectancy ratings were also very sensitive to verbal reversal 
instructions as illustrated by an increase in US expectancy ratings for R-CS- and a decrease for 
the R-CS+T/P and R-CS+T after the contingency reversal instructions (see Figure 1). 
Furthermore, also a small but reliable effect of the previous conditioning history was obtained 
for US expectancy ratings. That is, US expectancy ratings were slightly higher in the second 
phase for a threatened CS that was previously paired with the US (CS+T/P), compared to a 
threatened CS that was not previously paired with the US (CS+T) and a threatened CS that was 
previously safe (R-CS-). This latter result is in line with a prior study from our lab showing that 
US expectancy ratings were slightly elevated for a threatened CS when it was previously paired 
with the US (Mertens et al., 2015). However, the results of our Bayesian analysis showed that 
there was only anecdotal evidence for this effect in our data. Combined, these results show that 
participants adapted their expectancies about receiving an electric stimulus in accordance with 
the instructions, demonstrating that the instructions were clear. Interestingly, our data suggests 
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that participants also took previous CS-US pairings into account when providing US expectancy 
ratings. 
Finally, results obtained for SCRs were also in line with the verbal instructions, except 
for the CSs that had been actually paired with the US (CS+T/P’s). For these latter CSs, SCRs 
were comparable in the second phase of the experiment, regardless of the reversal instructions 
(see Figure 2). However, results in the reversal phase for the CS+T/P’s were not completely in 
line with the prior conditioning history either. That is, SCRs to R-CS+T/P were not significantly 
higher than to CS- in the reversal phase. Hence, SCRs seem to have been influenced by two 
opposing influences, that is, instructions on the one hand and actual CS-US pairings on the other 
hand. This result is in contrast with previous studies employing the contingency reversal 
procedure that found that SCRs were completely in line with the reversal instructions (Grings et 
al., 1973; McNally, 1981; Wilson, 1968). One potential reason for this discrepancy between our 
own results and the results from these earlier studies is the inclusion of threatened, but not 
actually conditioned, CSs. The fact that participants noticed that there were threatened and 
actually conditioned CS+s, as illustrated by the US expectancy ratings, may have prompted them 
to be more cautious about the instructions concerning the actually conditioned CS+s. However, 
this interpretation does not explain why we did not obtain a similar pattern for FPS. 
Alternatively, this result could suggest that SCRs reflect both simple associative learning and 
cognitive contingency learning. This interpretation is not in line with the findings of the studies 
outlined in the introduction, but does fit with the results of other studies that have found that 
SCRs can be dissociated under certain conditions from cognitive contingency learning (Bechara 
et al., 1995; McAndrew, Jones, McLaren, & McLaren, 2012). Regardless of the exact 
interpretation of the SCRs results, our results illustrate that SCRs were insensitive to verbal 
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instructions when a CS had been paired with the USs, while such an effect was not observed for 
FPS. This finding demonstrates that the classification of FPS and SCRs as affective and 
cognitive measures of fear conditioning, respectively, does not correspond with our data.  
Our conclusion runs counter the results of a number of studies that we mentioned in the 
introduction. We will discuss these studies in more detail here. First, some studies have found 
that conditioning of the startle reflex can occur in the absence of CS-US contingency awareness 
while such unaware conditioning was not obtained for SCRs (Hamm & Weike, 2005; Hamm & 
Vaitl, 1996; Sevenster et al., 2014). However, as mentioned before, a number of other studies 
have found conditioning of the startle reflex only for participants that became aware of the CS-
US contingencies (Dawson, Rissling, et al., 2007; Grillon, 2002; Jovanovic et al., 2006; Purkis & 
Lipp, 2001). Whether fear conditioning, or learning in general, can occur without contingency 
awareness is a question that has been proven to be difficult to answer and that requires 
appropriate measurement of contingency awareness (e.g., Shanks & St. John, 1994) and careful 
experimental control of other contingencies that could explain learning (e.g., Singh et al., 2013). 
A recent study by Sevenster et al. (2014) seems to meet these two criteria and nevertheless 
provide evidence for unaware conditioning of FPS but not of SCRs. While these results are 
certainly promising, it seems premature to us to conclude that conditioning of the startle reflex 
can occur in the absence of awareness given the conflicting evidence. Further replication of the 
result of Sevenster et al. (2014) will clarify whether this claim can be upheld. 
Second, two studies have shown that verbal instructions that the US will no longer be 
applied results in a complete reduction of SCRs but not of FPS, suggesting a dissociation 
between SCRs and FPS in their sensitivity to verbal instructions (Dawson, Rissling, et al., 2007; 
Sevenster et al., 2012a). However, in a recent study by Luck and Lipp (2015a), in which 
CONTINGENCY REVERSAL  26 
 
instructed extinction was combined with removal of the shock electrodes, a complete reduction 
of both SCRs and FPS was observed. As argued by Luck and Lipp (2015b), the incomplete 
reduction of FPS in the study of Sevenster et al. (2012a) can perhaps be explained by a subset of 
participants in their experiment that did not find the extinction instructions believable (because 
the shock electrodes remained attached in the study of Sevenster et al., 2012a). Furthermore, this 
incomplete reduction was perhaps not observed for SCRs due to increased SCRs to the CS- in 
the extinction phase for the instructed extinction group in the study of Sevenster et al. (2012a). A 
similar reasoning can also be applied to the results of Dawson, Rissling, et al. (2007) because 
their experiment employed a picture-picture evaluative conditioning procedure. Hence, 
participants could not be sure that the USs would no longer be applied (because the computer 
screen was not removed), resulting in unconvincing extinction instructions. However, it remains 
unclear from the data of Dawson, Rissling, et al. (2007) why such an effect was not obtained for 
SCRs because pre and post extinction SCR data are not provided in their article. Hence, taken 
together, the studies investigating effects of instructed extinction on SCRs and FPS do not 
provide definitive evidence for a dissociation between SCRs and FPS either.  
Finally, a number of recent studies have demonstrated that behavioral or pharmacological 
manipulations during a reconsolidation phase specifically reduce FPS but leave expectancy 
ratings and conditioned SCRs intact (Kindt et al., 2009; Sevenster, Beckers, & Kindt, 2012b, 
2013; Soeter & Kindt, 2010, 2012). These studies provide persuasive evidence that FPS can be 
dissociated from cognitive measures of conditioned fear. However, other studies have found a 
reduction of conditioned SCRs after disruption of reconsolidation as well (Oyarzún et al., 2012; 
Schiller et al., 2010), while still others did not find the disruption of reconsolidation effect either 
for FPS or SCRs (Bos, Beckers, & Kindt, 2014; Golkar, Bellander, Olsson, & Ohman, 2012). 
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Furthermore, erasure of fear memories through reconsolidation has been shown to depend on 
prediction error as captured by US expectancy ratings (Sevenster et al., 2013) and some evidence 
could even suggest that these disruption of reconsolidation effects are more pronounced with 
concurrent US expectancy ratings (Warren et al., 2014). Thus, reduction of FPS through 
disruption of reconsolidation may not be as independent of expectancies and SCRs as some 
studies suggest. Hence, considering all these different studies, currently the data available with 
regard to unaware learning, instructed extinction and disruption of reconsolidation do not 
provide definitive evidence that FPS reflects automatic affective learning. The results of the 
current study provide further evidence that FPS may reflect cognitive contingency learning rather 
than automatic affective learning. 
However, there are several limitations to this study that should be acknowledged. First, as 
described by Öhman and Mineka (2001), the affective learning module is only selectively 
activated by biologically relevant or highly aversive stimuli. Therefore, mild electric stimuli as 
USs and geometric shapes as CSs might not be sufficient to recruit this affective learning module 
in the learning process. It would be interesting to conduct a follow-up study looking at whether 
similar results would be obtained with more ecologically valid CSs and USs. A second limitation 
is that the CS+T/P’s and the US were paired on only three occasions throughout the experiment, 
which might not be a sufficient number of pairings for simple associative learning to take place. 
On the other hand, if affective learning is an evolutionary adaptive process, it is unlikely that a 
high number of CS-US pairings is required for simple associative learning to take place. Third, 
we gave explicit verbal instructions about all the contingencies and asked participants on every 
trial to provide ratings about the extent to which they expected the US. There is evidence that 
including online US expectancy ratings maintains fear conditioning in patients with damage in 
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the amygdala (Coppens, Spruyt, Vandenbulcke, Van Paesschen, & Vansteenwegen, 2009). 
Furthermore, some studies have compared participants who were instructed about the stimulus 
contingencies with participants who were either unaware of the contingencies or who learned the 
contingencies spontaneously. These studies revealed increased activation in brain areas that have 
been related to decision making and cognitive control in the instructed group (e.g., rostral 
dmPFC, lateral OFC; Mechias, Etkin, & Kalisch, 2010; Tabbert et al., 2011). Combined, these 
studies suggest that online US expectancy ratings and contingency instructions may induce a 
more cognitive way of learning about the CS-US pairings and consequently limited the 
contribution of affective learning (Coppens et al., 2009). Therefore, it is possible that if CS-US 
contingencies are learned in a spontaneous manner, stronger effects of the previous conditioning 
history could be obtained. 
Taking into account these reservations, we conclude that FPS should not by default be 
regarded as a measure of affective learning that is independent of SCRs and expectancy ratings. 
The results of our experiment demonstrate that conditioning of the startle reflex can depend on 
verbal instructions and expectancies about the occurrence of the US and does not necessarily 
follow simple associative learning rules. 
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